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INTRODUCTION
Definition and History
Michael Wallach and Nathan Kogan (1959) devised the Choice
Dilemmas Questionnaire (Appendix A) for scaling the propensity of
individuals to take risks. The Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ)
requires the respondent to indicate the lowest probability of success
he would accept before he would advise the central figure in each of
12 hypothetical decision situations to choose the riskier--but more
attractive--of two options. Accepting slimmer chances of success
(higher risks of failure) yields a iowei (riskier) seoi-e. The t>core on
a given item can range from a risky low of one chance in ten to a con-
servative high--in most experiments--of ten in ten, indicating refusal
to take any risk at all.
Stoner (1961) arranged for subjects to discuss the 12 issues in
groups and discovered that unanimous decisions were usually riskier
than the mean of previous individual scores. Furthermore, after
discussing the issues, individuals by themselves tended to register
riskier* averages than they had on the pretests. This tendency for
group or individual scores to reflect increased riskiness after a dis-
cussion has been termed the "risky shift", and it has been the subject
of extensive subsequent investigation. For two of the 12 hypothetical
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situations, however, scores have frequently reflected less riskiness
following discussion, an effect referred to as "cautious shift".
_
T
_he Generality of th_e Group-Induced Choice
Shift on a Risk Dimension
How widespread is the risky shift phenomenon? Persons of both
sexes, several nationalities, varying ages, and many vocations have
shown increased riskiness after they have participated in discussions
of several sorts, all of which were related to their subsequent decisions
(Pruitt, 1971a, 1971b). Furthermore, simply telling people the CDQ
odds others have chosen usually increases their willingness to assume
risks (Bell and Jamieson, 1970; Clark, Crockett, and Archer, 1971;
Murdock, Myers, and Smith, 1970; St. Jean, 1970; Stokes, 1971; Teger
and Pruitt, 1967; Wallach and Kogan, 1965) and so does observing dis-
cussions of the issues or listening to recordings of them (Bell and
Jamieson, 1970; Kogan and Wallach, 1967; Lamm, 1967; St. Jean, 1970).
In addition, shifts have occasionally appeared on risk-oriented items
other than the ones discussed (Alker and Kogan, 1968; Graham and
Harris, 1969). Experimenters have gained support for the generality
of the shift effect from observed increases in tangible (actual and
believed) risks of pain, intellectual failure and failure in skilled perfor-
mances (Wallach, Kogan, and Bern, 1964). Clausen (1965), Kogan and
Zaleska (1969), Lonergan and McClintock (1961), and Pruitt and Teger
(19 69) produced risky shifts by having subjects gamble in groups. With
respect to subjects and treatments, then, the shift phenomenon appears
to be fairly widespread.
The present study extends the generality of risky shift inquiry.
Among other assumptions, theorists have questioned whether choice
shifts actually occur in natural groups and in natural settings (Cart-
wright, 1971). It is neither feasible to manipulate nor feasible to claim
to simulate group experiences, but while conditions must be contrived,
associations need not be. For this reason, the present study investi-
gates the phenomenon of the risky shift among groups of friends. Cart-
wright remarks that the groups examined so far " . . . have certain
'unnatural1 properties," that they " . . . are created for experimental
purposes and, consequently, have no history, future, established
structure, or significant enduring relationships with a surrounding
social system [p. 373]. " He also notes: "The experimental conditions
employed in research on choice dilemmas cannot be conceived as
simulating any typical natural setting . . . The only feasible way . . ."
he sees to generalize from laboratory settings to natural ones " . . .
would seem to be through the use of theory [p. 374]. " A theory will
be posited here which may be unique in predicting stronger shifts in
groups of friends (who have presumably made decisions together in
the past) than among randomly assembled subjects who are unpracticed
at making choices together. The present experiment tests that hypothesis.
A Militant Enthusiasm Theory of jthe Risky Shift
The present study proposes to interpret risky shift as a special
case of naturalist Konrad Lorenz1 (1963) concept of "militant enthusiasm.
Militant enthusiasm is the "communal aggression" which groups of pri-
mates display in the face of danger or competition. It is a phylogene-
tically programmed response which appears to bear a clear resemblance
to the enhancement of risk taking in groups. Militant enthusiasm,
according to Lorenz, heightens the readiness of humans to espouse
causes or values just as it mobilizes "team spirit" among troops of apes.
A group incites its members to defend or advance the group by
virtue of regular roles and routines. For instance, ethologists have
observed that chimpanzees whoop, leap about, wave their arms, and
beat the ground in a manner reminiscent of human cheerleaders to
urge the troop's dominant males into action against an enemy. Baboon
leaders encourage each other by making progressively closer thrusts
at an enemy. The chief baboon attacks first, followed by successive
subordinates. The observation that baboons have killed large cats by
concerted attacks, sacrificing one or more of their number to protect
the group testifies to the risk-taking character of "prehuman chauvinism"
Apparently, species perpetrate this mechanism by which groups enhance
their members' readiness to take risks in the face of adversity.
L Extending ethological concepts to verbal behavior.
How can this mechanism be applied to the risky shift paradigm?
Pretending to advise the hypothetical person in one of these dilemmas
is reasoned to generate (through projection) processes similar to those
generated by actual risks. After all, most measures of typical per-
formance rely on the subject's putting himself in imaginary situations,
and Kogan and Wallach (19 64) did intend for their CDQ dilemmas to
represent "situations which are likely to occur in everyday life [p. 256]. "
Each discussant puts himself in the place of the hypothetical central
figure so that the group acts in the behalf of the imaginary person and
vests him with its strength of numbers and organization. This collective
projection even applies to subjects who only observe discussions or
receive reports of others' choices. They act as constituents of a
remote or hypothetical communion. Pruitt (1971a) remarks that it is
just as possible for people to imagine unheard arguments when told of
decisions as it is for others to surmise fellow subjects' undisclosed
positions from their arguments.
How is a CDQ decision like facing actual risks? Although res-
ponses to a CDQ item spread rather evenly across the possible risk
levels (Cecil, 1967), the majority of subjects do elect to take the riskier
course of action if given even a small chance of success. Only a minority
advises the hypothetical person to refuse to try to gain the advantage no
matter how small the risk. The question is seldom whether to take a
chance; it is usually a question of what odds to accept. This situation
parallels the dilemma of a chimpanzee troop when it meets a threat.
There is an implicit resolve in many instances to meet the challenge--
to take the risk. The task of the group is to ensure that its members
dare to act. Risks which are actually voluntarily assumed seem to
impose themselves on the group, and their undertaking seems to be for
the sake of the group, one of its members, or even its advisee.
Furthermore, as Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory
postulates, once people set on a course of action, it attracts them more
strongly than alternate courses do. "All obstacles in its path become
unimportant, " says Lorenz. "Rational arguments against the behavior
dictated by militant enthusiasm are silenced. . . [p. 26UJ. " Moscovici
and Zavalloni (19 69) contend that the risky-shifting subject also " . . .
binds himself to the choice and thus commits himself. . . [p. 127]. "
This contention is compatible with the evidence that hypothetical situ-
ations in the CDQ which yield initially riskier scores also provoke more
radical shifts (Teger and Pruitt, 1967).
2. The parallel between militant enthusiasm and
the value theories of the risky shift.
Lorenz identified several conditions which are prerequisite to the
triggering of militant enthusiasm. Parallel conditions surround the
occurrence of the risky shift effect. "First of all, " Lorenz stipulates,
"a social unit with which the subject identifies himself must appear to
be threatened by some danger from outside [p. 263]. " It has already
been argued that CDQ discussants tend to regard a risky course of
action as an unavoidable challenge or threat. The most commonly
accepted explanations of the risky shift, the "value theories, " suggest
that Avhat is threatened in the course of a CDQ discussion is failure to
achieve the goal contingent upon choosing the riskier alternate. CDQ
goals have hedonistic values for the imaginary central figure, and these
values are described by both the value theorists (Nordh</>y, 19 62) and by
Lorenz as being widely held in the culture of the group--victory in
chess and football, a happy marriage, sound financial investment,
personal health, etc. Brown (1965) postulates that among the values
threatened in the CDQ situation is the taking of risk itself, a notion
which has enjoyed considerable support. Lamm, Schaude, and
Trommsdorf (1971), for example, found that subjects admired CDQ
positions which were riskier than their own and believed their peers
were more cautious than themselves. Jellison and Riskind (1970)
found that people see riskiness as a sign of ability and that riskier
persons are more eager to show their ability than cautious ones. As
in Festinger's (1954) social-comparison theory, everyone wants to be
somewhat more able than the people around him. Able people succeed.
They are rewarded. They appear confident. A person must try in
order to succeed, and his attempts entail risks. Therefore, confident,
competent people take risks and are rewarded by success, sustaining
Brown's assertion that people value risk for its own sake as well as
for its consequences.
Besides being associated with competence, many risks pay off
often enough to sustain their emission, while people seldom perceive
the avoidance of failure as equally gratifying. Consequently, people
are more likely to take risks than risks are likely to succeed. The
respondent seems to bet that he will "beat" the odds he chooses by
virtue of his own luck or--again--ability. If he were truly rational
in setting the probability of the success of the risky alternate, that
probability would actually register the "subjective expected utilities"
of the status quo and the potential gain and loss (Burnstein, Miller,
Vinokur, Katz, and Crowley, 1971). Statistical decision strategies
balance values and probabilities according to a logical formula, and
Kogan and Wallach (19 64), in their study showing CDQ correlations with
other measures of risk taking and other organismic variables, found
that people who are not anxious or defensive optimize their risk taking
according to contextual cues. Most people, however, evidently expect
to succeed more often than the odds predict.
As in militant enthusiasm, CDQ discussion groups are thought
to enhance their members' propensity toward risk taking. Brown (1965)
demonstrated that each member of a group tries to maintain a stance
which is slightly riskier than the group average, and Pruitt (1969)
presented evidence that persons are released from cautious sanctions
by their surprising discovery that others sanction riskier (more ideal)
positions. Just as dominant apes pass closer and closer to a threatening
agent, CDQ discussants risk riskier and riskier opinions. Venturing
a riskier stance in the group--it is theorized—constitutes a claim for
status (dominant apes attack first) at the risk of rebuff. Consensual
validation reciprocally reinforces risk taking and could account for the
almost significant increases in self-esteem following risky shifts
reported by Lamm, Schaude, and Trommsdorf (1971). In parallel,
Lorenz (1963) says that militant enthusiasm "engenders a specific
feeling of intense satisfaction [p. 262]. " Reciprocal reinforcement may
arise from arguments supporting " . . . values commonly accepted in
the culture. . . [p. 4]" (Nordh^y, 1962) and provide the "affective
interdependences" which Wallach and Kogan (1965) believe " . . . leads
individuals to feel linked, to at least some extent, in a common fate.
Such a sense of connectedness seems to depend crucially on the element
of discussion [p. 17]. " It seems possible that by imitation of others'
self-presentations of confidence, a cooperative effect is generated
through competition. People dare each other to act bravely and en-
courage each other by incrementally assuming riskier and riskier
stances.
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3. Leadership in militant enthusiasm
and the risky shift.
A second prerequisite for triggering militant enthusiasm is
"an inspiring leader figure" (Lorenz, 1963), a notion which has proven
parallels in the risky shift phenomenon. Burnstein (1969) found that
the riskiest discussant on a particular item possesses greater confi-
dence about his position than his middling colleagues and that he
influences them through his self-assertion. Clausen (1965) sustained
this finding with a gambling measure of risk. Burns (1967) was able
to predict a major portion of the decisions in one study by applying the
proposition that moderate risk-takers adopt positions nearer the more
extreme members who are also more confident and steadfast. Burns'
study complemented Vidmar's (1970) claim that the extent of differences
of opinion among members of a group at the outset of a discussion, and
not their average riskiness on each CDQ item, is correlated with the
strength of their shifts on each item. Ellis, Spencer, and Oldfield-
Box (1969), indeed, observed no shift in groups whose constituents held
identical opinions on every issue. As Castore, Peterson, and Good-
rich (1971) reported, stronger shifts appear to occur in those of their
groups which included highly confident risk takers.
11
.ii. Group s_ize and the strength of militant
enthusiasm and the risky shift.
Another prerequisite for militant enthusiasm is number. As
Lorenz states, " . . . excitation grows in proportion . . . with the
increasing number of individuals . . . all agitated by the same emotion
[p. 264]. " Similarly, the magnitude of risky shifts increases with the
number of participants. Although Lamm, Schaude, and Trommsdorf
(1971) produced risky shifts in groups of two, Teger and Pruitt (1967)
demonstrated that group size is positively related to the strength of
the shift.
Implications of the Militant Enthusiasm Theory
for Natural and Random Groups
The theory outlined above may be little more than a compendium
of appealing analogies. The thesis that CDQ discussions literally
constitute verbal versions of militant enthusiasm is scarcely an inex-
orable one. Nevertheless, the parallels between the two phenomena
merge into one pertinent implication: By comparison with arbitrary
groups, friends are expected to enact mutual encouragement, leadership,
and reciprocal support under stress with greater cohesiveness and profi-
ciency, since they have enacted these role relationships together in
the past. All previous risky research has employed groups of
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arbitrarily assembled subjects, and in some instances, researchers
have even taken measures to prevent placing friends in the same groups
(Johnson and Andrews, 1971). Relative to groups of friends, these
groups seem likely to engender little cohesiveness and afford little
opportunity for the enactment of leadership roles. Therefore, it is
predicted that groups of friends will display greater shifts toward
riskiness after discussing the CDQ issues than will randomly associated
subjects (who are expected to display risky shifts of some magnitude).
METHOD
Design
The hypothesis was tested by means of a 2 x 2 posttest-only
factorial design as depicted in Table 1.
TABLE 1
2 x 2 FACTORIAL DESIGN COMPARING THE EFFECTS OF DISCUSSION
OF THE CDQ TO NO DISCUSSION IN RANDOM TRIADS AND TRIADS OF
FRIENDS
Discussion Factor
Group
Composition
(Non-Discuss ants) Discussants
Triads
of
Friends
Randomly
Selected
Triads
Triad 1
Triad 2
Triad 3
Triad 4
Triad 5
Triad 1
Triad 2
Triad 3
Triad 4
Triad 5
Triad 1
Triad 2
Triad 3
Triad 4
Triad 5
Triad 1
Triad 2
Triad 3
Triad 4
Triad 5
Five triads (groups of three subjects each) were assigned to each cell.
The members of half of these triads selected their friends to be their
fellow members. The experimenter randomly formed the other ten triads.
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Within half of the triads of friends and within half of the random triads,
the members discussed the hypothetical situations and then completed the
Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire individually. The remaining subjects
served as controls by merely completing the questionnaire without dis-
cussing its contents. Since there was no reason to expect any differences
in riskiness between friends who did not discuss the issues and random
non-dis cuss ants, the predicted relationship between the mean levels of
riskiness for the subjects of the four cells were as illustrated in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
PREDICTED CDQ-SCORE COMPARISONS BETWEEN FRIENDS AND
RANDOMLY ASSOCIATED SUBJECTS FOLLOWING DISCUSSION AND
CONTROL TREATMENTS
Higher
Riskiness
Lower
Riskiness
Random
Triads
Discussants
Non-Discussants (Control)
Triads
of
Friends
Group Composition
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Such findings would indicate that a "shift" toward greater riskiness
had occurred for both the triads of friends and the random triads who
had engaged in discussions, though the greater shift had occurred for
the friends.
Instrument
This study employed the Kogan-Wallach (19 64) Choice Dilemmas
Procedure. The CDQ was printed in the form of a booklet (Appendix A).
Each situation--with the omission of CDQ Items 5 and l2--was described
on a separate page. Items 5 and 12, however, were printed on the first
two pages of the CDQ booklets as examples. Answer booklets were
printed separately from, the booklets describing the dilemmas. A
mark indicating refusal to advise the riskier course of action was
counted as 11 in 10 chances of success so that the odds scale had equal
intervals (1 in 10, 3 in 10, 5 in 10, 7 in 10, 9 in 10, and 11 in 10). Conse-
quently, the lowest possible score for each subject would be 10, the
highest 110, and the range 100. By subtracting every score from 110,
a percentage score was obtained whereby 0 equals the most conservative
possible score and 100 equals the riskiest possible score. Such a
percentage score has not been employed in previous studies, but it
does not alter the basic nature or the meaning of the CDQ scores.
The standard CDQ instructions were replaced by those in Appendix B.
These revised instructions were developed for improved clarity for
16
younger subjects by testing them on small subject samples prior to
the experiment.
Procedure
The participants were 60 summer session juniors and seniors
at Clarksville, Tennessee, High School. Twenty-nine were male/
Thirty-one were female. All 60 volunteers assembled in a lecture
hall, and each received one white card and one colored card. They
printed their names in large letters on these cards, then the experi-
menter collected the cards and displayed the white cards on a table
just outside the room so that all 60 names could be easily read. The
experimenter used the colored cards to make random selections.
Ten participants were drawn at random and served as nuclei for the
natural (self-selected groups). The procedure for self-selection was
to call a nucleus subject to the display table and ask him to choose the
person still inside the lecture room whom "he knew best" to join him.
The person of his choice was also to be a person whom he preferred,
associated with frequently, had known for more than a short time,
considered a personal friend, and who belonged to the nucleus subject's
group of friends. Not all of these criteria could be met for all cases,
but the best combination was required with the stress (made by repeti-
tion) on the factor of "how well" the chosen person was known. This
chosen person was called out of the lecture room to join the nucleus
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subject in the mutual choice of a third person by the same standard.
When a group was formed and sent away from the selection
area, its members' cards were removed from the display so that their
names could not be chosen in subsequent selections. When 30 subjects
had formed ten "natural" groups, the remaining 30 display cards were
shuffled and randomly divided into threes for forming the "random"
groups. The experimenter directed every other triad to one room for
the discussion treatment and the alternate triads to another room for
the control conditions. One member of each discussant triad received
three inconspicuously marked CDQ booklets and was asked to hold all
of them for the group's later use and not to read the material until
instructed. Each of the non-discuss ants received one CDQ booklet
and one answer booklet and was asked not to look at his booklets until
directed. The answer booklets also bore inconspicuous marks. These
marks identified the materials according to triad membership and
treatment condition.
When each group reached its assigned room, an assistant stationed
there seated it at a separate table well removed from the others to
obviate communication between groups. The assistant asked the sub-
jects to place their CDQ materials face-down on their respective tables
and to wait for instructions. The experimenter administered the instruc-
tions in Appendix B en masse in both rooms and left the assistant in
each room to oversee their execution.
The discussion instructions charged the discussants to limit
their conversations to their respective groups and to discuss only the
CDQ situations--the two examples first, then the ten actual test items.
At five-minute intervals, the assistant told the subjects to proceed to
the next discussion item and so on until all of the situations had been
discussed. Nothing was mentioned about acceptable odds or group
decisions until after the discussions. The subjects were simply to
give each other their reasons for choosing the safe or risky alternates.
Both the discussants and the control subjects received detailed
instructions concerning the meaning of the probability choices and
were urged to fill out their answer booklets independently. After all
subjects had completed the task, the assistants collected all materials
and the experimenter debriefed the subjects and thanked them for their
participation.
Analysis of Results
As described above, each subject received a single "riskiness"
score on the Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire. A 2 x 2 x 5 analysis of
variance was applied to these scores. In keeping with the anticipated
relation between means illustrated in Figure 1, results consistent with
the hypotheses would be revealed as a significant main effect on the
discussion factor, and a significant interaction between the discussion
and group composition factors.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the means of the scores (higher = riskier) for
the four experimental conditions representing the interaction between
the composition factor and the discussion factor.
TABLE 2
MEAN LEVELS OF RISKINESS FOR TRIADS OF FRIENDS
AND RANDOM TRIADS AS A FUNCTION OF DISCUSSION
Group Composition
Triads of Friends
Random Triads
Non-Discuss ion
53. 73
46. 66
Discussion
39. 79
51.19
19
20
The analysis of variance summarized in Table 3 shows that there were
no significant main effects but that the interaction between group compo-
sition and discussion was highly significant (F-8 . 35, df = l/40, £< . 01).
TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE
Source
Discussion
Composition
Disc, x Comp.
Disc, x Triads
Disc, x Comp. x Triads
Error
Total
df
1
4
1
4
4
4
40
59
MS
70. 417
331.350
73 600
1278. 816
70. 677
86. 100
84. 224
141.116
F
< 1
2. 42
<: i
8. 35*
<1
<1
<l
*£ .01
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However, as Figure 2 indicates, the pattern of means which produced
this interaction was not the predicted one.
FIGURE 2
MEAN RISKINESS OF RANDOMLY ASSIGNED SUBJECTS AND FRIENDS
IN THE DISCUSSION AND CONTROL CONDITIONS
Higher
Riskiness
r- r\rrf
DV-/0
40%
Lower
Riskiness
Random
Triads
Non-Discuss ants
Discussants
Triads
of
Friends
Group Composition
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As the _t tests in Table 4 indicate, the randomly assembled discussants
were not significantly riskier than the randomly assembled non-
discussants but, contrary to prediction, the discussant friends were
significantly more cautious than both their non-discuss ant counterparts
and the randomly assigned discussants.
TABLE 4
TESTS OF SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPARISONS OF
THE GROUP COMPOSITION AND DISCUSSION MEANS
Comparison
Discussant Friends - Control Friends
Random Discussants - Random Controls
Random Discussants - Discussant Friends
Control Friends - Random Controls
Difference
-13.94
4. 53
11.40
7. 07
jt
3. 20*
1. 04
1. 62
*p. < . 01
**p.< . 05
DISCUSSION
Two aspects of the present study challenge the generality of the
risky-shift effect. The first of these is the failure to obtain a risky
shift for arbitrarily assembled subjects using a between-groups
posttest-only design. Only two previous risky-shift experiments have
used between-group designs instead of the standard, pretest-posttest
paradigm (Pruitt, 1971b). The arbitrarily assembled discussants in
these two experiments (Carlson and Davis, 1971: McCauley, Teger,
and Kogan, 1971) as well as those in the present experiment exceeded
their control counterparts in riskiness by only a non-significant margin.
The two previous posttest-only studies also interjected three additional
requirements into their groups' decision-making: the achievement of
group consensus, the manifest acceptance of specific levels of risk,
and individual choices of odds prior to any collective consideration of
the problems. The deletion of these requirements from the present
study was expected to facilitate risky shifts, but these shifts still did
not occur. The posttest-only design seems to more closely approximate
real-life decision making.
Secondly, the cautious shift among groups of friends was not
anticipated, therefore this discussion can do no better than offer a few
23
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plausible but £ost hoc explanations for it. There is some evidence
that group cohesiveness has at least a restraining effect on shifts
toward increased risk. And it may be that the singular cohesiveness
which is presumed to characterize groups of friends can, in fact,
reverse the tendency to assume greater risks in groups. Dion,
Miller, and Magnan (1971) found that in groups whose cohesiveness
is supposed to have been enhanced by telling their members they had
been combined on the basis of similar backgrounds and personalities,
smaller risky shifts occurred than in groups whose members were
told they were not expected to be very congenial.
One aspect of cohesiveness which might precipitate the cautious
shift is the homogeneity of the opinions of group members. Friends
probably hold more similar opinions and inclinations than transient
associates and may be able to estimate more accurately what odds their
fellows will choose. Consequently, they may furnish each other less
new information than do transient groups about "where others stand"--
information which is regarded by the value theories as being prere-
quisite to risky shifts.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of group cohesiveness as far as
risky shift is concerned is that of responsibility. Quite possibly the stron-
ger sense of responsibility within groups of friends makes these subjects
more cautious. One of the earliest explanations of the risky shift--the
diffusion-of-responsibility model (Wallach, et. al., 1964)--attributed the
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increased riskiness in collective decisions to the attenuation of
anxiety about the blame which redounds from adverse outcomes.
More or less equally, every participant must answer for the con-
sequences of a collective decision, so the responsibility for failure
is transferred from the individual to the group. According to
responsibility-diffusion theory, sharing the blame diminishes it
for the individual, but it should be noted that sharing the conse-
quences of a group decision does not necessarily ameliorate them.
Furthermore, it would seem that among friends, potential failure
threatens not only individuals but also those whom they care about
and feel responsible for. Consequently, the possibility that aver-
si^e cons?cu?nc?? will be ^harprl anompnts thpir thTPatem'ng char-
acter. The diffusion-of-responsibility model rests on the assumption
that people want to spread the blame for errors of judgment. It
seems likely, however, that members of continuing and cohesive
groups are more concerned with protecting themselves and their
fellow members from harm or hardship.
The argument that social responsibility brings about cautious
shifts among friends benefits from several precedents. Dion, Miller,
and Magnan (1971) conjecture that it is easier for people to let stran-
gers than to let friends shoulder the suffering incident to risk-taking
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failures. They also suggest that responsibility is incumbent upon
rank and is not borne equally by all members of a group. They cite
Jones and Gerard's (1967) contention that structural factors such
as leadership and other organizational roles inhibit risky shifts.
This presumption is supported by Wallach, Kogan, and Bern's (1964)
finding that making a person responsible for others makes that per-
son in authorit}r more conservative. Dion, et. al. , have also
presented evidence that social responsibility inhibits the risky shift
in groups who assume that their advice is binding compared to
groups who assume that their CDQ advisees have the right to reject
the recommendations of the group. It is reasonable to infer from
these findings that the inhibition of risk taking is stronger if the
advisee is a standing member of a natural group commissioned to
counsel him.
A similar inference can be drawn about Stokes1 (1971) notion
that the cautious-shifting CDQ issues (Items 5 and 12--omitted from
the present study) " . . . carry more consequences, both beneficial
and adverse, for persons other than the central character (e.g. a
wife or family) than do risky items [p. 405]. " If responsibility to
imagined others in hypothetical circumstances can deter risk taking,
then risks involving persons to whom a person is actually responsible
could very well induce the person to take smaller risks that he would
without the influence of such affiliations.
27
Again, the upshot of the present study is to question the external
validity of the risky shift phenomenon. Further studies of natural
groups and the manipulation of reciprocal responsibilities within
discussion groups might help unravel the theoretical quandaries engen-
dered by risky-shift research.
APPENDIX A
CHOICE DILEMMAS QUESTIONNAIRE BOOKLET AND ANSWER
SHEET
Booklets were made by printing copies of 8 1/2" by 11" pages with
one item on the upper section of each page and another on its lower
section, then cutting across the middle of each page to produce two
8 1/2" by 5 1/2" pages as indicated by the dotted lines. The booklets
were stapled together--twelve pages per booklet with two example
items and ten scored items per booklet.
28
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EXAMPLE: A
Mr. M is contemplating marriage to Miss T, a girl whom he has
known for a little more than a year. Recently, however, a number of
arguments have occurred between them, suggesting some sharp
differences of opinion in the way each views certain matters. Indeed,
they decide to seek professional advice from a marriage counselor as
to whether it would be wise for them to marry. On the basis of these
meetings with a marriage counselor, they realize that a happy marriage,
while possible, would not be assured.
EXAMPLE: B
Mr. E is president of a light metals corporation in the United States.
The corporation is quite prosperous, and has strongly considered the
possibilities of business expansion by building an additional plant in a
new location. The choice is between building another plant in the U. S. ,
where there would be a moderate return on the initial investment, or
building a plant in a foreign country. Lower labor costs and easy access
to raw materials in that country would mean a much higher return on the
initial investment. On the other hand, there is history of political insta-
bility and revolution in the foreign country under consideration. In fact,
the leader of a small minority party is committed to nationalizing, that
is, taking over, all foreign investments.
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v, ^ F ' a n e l e c t r i c a l engineer, who is married and has one child,
has been working for a large electronics corporation since graduating
from college five years ago. He is assured of a lifetime job with a
modest, though adequate, salary, and liberal pension benefits upon
retirement. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary
will increase much before he retires. While attending a convention,
Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded company which
has a highly uncertain future. The new job would pay more to start
and would offer the possibility of a share in the ownership if the com-
pany survived the competition of the larger firms.
2. Mr. B, a 45-year-old accountant, has recently been informed by
his physician that he has developed a severe heart ailment. The
disease would be sufficiently serious to force Mr. B to change many
of his strongest life habits--reducing his work load, drastically
changing his diet, giving up favorite leisure-time pursuits. The
physician suggests that a delicate medical operation could be
attempted which, if successful, would completely relieve the heart
condition. But its success could not be assured, and in fact, the
operation might prove fatal.
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Mr. C, a married man with two children, has a steady job that
pays him about $6000 per year. He can easily afford the necessities
of life, but few of the luxuries. Mr. C's father, who died recently,
carried a $4000 life insurance policy. Mr. C would like to invest
this money in stocks. He is well aware of the secure "blue-chip"
stocks and bonds that would pay approximately 6% on his investment.
On the other hand, Mr. C has heard that the stocks of a relatively
unknown Company X might double their present value if a new product
currently in production is favorably received by the buying public.
However, if the product is unfavorably received, the stocks would
decline in value.
4. Mr. D is the captain of College X's football team. College X is
playing its traditional rival, College Y, in the final game of the season.
The game is in its final seconds, and Mr. D's team, College X, is
behind in the score. College X has time to run one more play. Mr. D,
the captain, must decide whether it would be best to settle for a tie
score with'a play which would be almost certain to work or, on the
other hand, should he try a more complicated and risky play which
could bring victory if it succeeded, but defeat if not.
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5. Mr. F is currently a college senior who is very eager to pursue
graduate study in chemistry leading to the Doctor of Philosophy degree.
He has been accepted by both University X and University Y. Univ-
ersity X has a world-wide reputation for excellence in chemistry.
While a degree from University X would signify outstanding training
in this field, the standards are so very rigorous that only a fraction
of the degree candidates actually receive the degree. University Y,
on the other hand, has much less of a reputation in chemistry, but
almost everyone admitted is awarded the Doctor of Philosophy degree,
though the degree has much less prestige than the corresponding
degree from University X.
6. Mr. G, a competent chess player, is participating in a national
chess tournament. In an early match he draws the top-favored player
in the tournament as his opponent. Mr. G has been given a relatively
low ranking in view of his performance in previous tournaments.
During the course of his play with the top-favored man, Mr. G notes
the possibility of a deceptive though risky maneuver which might bring
him a quick victory. At the same time, if the attempted maneuver
should fail, Mr. G would be left in an exposed position and defeat
would almost certainly follow.
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Mr. H, a college senior, has studied the piano since childhood.
He has won amateur prizes and given small recitals, suggesting
that Mr. H has considerable musical talent. As graduation approaches,
Mr. H has the choice of going to medical school to become a physician,
a profession which would bring certain prestige and financial rewards;
or entering a conservatory of music for advanced training with a well-
known pianist. Mr. H realizes that even upon completion of his piano
studies, which would take many more years and a lot of money,
success as a concert pianist would not be assured.
8. Mr. J is an American captured by the enemy in World War II
and placed in a prisoner-of-war camp. Conditions in the camp are
quite bad, with long hours of hard physical labor and a barely suffi-
cient diet. After spending several months in this camp, Mr. J
notes the possibility of escape by concealing himself in a supply truck
that shuttles in and out of the camp. Of course, there is no guarantee
that the escape would prove successful. Recapture by the enemy could
well mean execution.
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9. Mr. K is a successful businessman who has participated in a
number of civic activities of considerable value to the community.
Mr. K has been approached by the leaders of his political party as
a possible congressional candidate in the next election. Mr. K's
party is a minority party in the district, though the party has won
occasional elections in the past. Mr. K would like to hold political
office, but to do so would involve a serious financial sacrifice, since
the party has insufficient campaign funds. He would also have to
endure the attacks of his political opponents in a hot campaign.
10. Mr. L, a married 30-year-old research physicist, has been given
a five-year appointment by a major university laboratory. As he
contemplates the next five years, he realizes that he might work on a
difficult, long-term problem which, if a solution could be found, would
resolve basic scientific issues in the field and bring high scientific
honors. If no solution were found, however, Mr. L would have little
to show for his five years in the laboratory, and this would make it
hard for him to get a good job afterwards. On the other hand, he could,
as most of his professional associates are doing, work on a series of
short-term problems where solutions would be easier to find, but
where the problems are of lesser scientific importance.
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EXAMPLE: A
Imagine that you are advising Mr. M and Miss T. Listed below
are several probabilities or odds that their marriage would prove
to be a happy and successful one.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable for Mr. M and Miss T to get married.
Place a check here if you think Mr. M and Miss T should
not marry, no matter what the probabilities.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and
successful.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and
successful.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and
successful.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and
successful.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and
successful.
EXAMPLE: B
Imagine that you are advising Mr. E. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds of continued political stability in the foreign
country under consideration.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable for Mr. E's corporation to build a plant in that country.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the foreign country will remain
politically stable.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the foreign country will remain
politically stable.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the foreign country will remain
politically stable.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the foreign country will remain
politically stable.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the foreign country will remain
' politically stable.
Place a check here if you think Mr. E's corporation should not
build a plant in the foreign country, no matter what the probabilities.
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1. Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds of the new company's proving financially sound.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider accepta-
ble to make it worthwhile for Mr. A to take the new job.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove financially
sound.
T h e
 chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove financially
sound.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove financially
sound.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will prove financially
sound.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the company will prove financially
sound.
Place a check here if you think Mr. A should not take the new
job no matter what the probabilities.
2. Imagine that you are advising Mr. B. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that the operation will prove successful.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider accepta-
ble for the operation to be performed.
Place a check here if you think Mr. B should not have the
operation no matter what the probabilities.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the operation will be a success.
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3. Imagine that you are advising Mr. C. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that Company X stocks will double their value.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable for Mr. C to invest in Company X Stocks.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the stocks will double their value.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the stocks will double their value.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the stocks will double their value.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the stocks will double their value.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the stocks will double their value.
Place a check here if you think Mr. C should not invest in
Company X stocks, no matter what the probabilities.
4. Imagine that you are advising Mr. D. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that the risky play will work.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable for the risky play to be attempted.
Place a check here if you think Mr. D should not attempt
the risky play no matter what the probabilities.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the risky play will work.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the risky play will work.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the risky play will work.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the risky play will work.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the risky play will work.
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5. Imagine that you are advising Mr. F. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that Mr. F would be awarded a degree at
University X, the one with the greater prestige.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. F to enroll in University X
rather than University Y.
Place a check here if you think Mr. F should not enroll in
University X, no matter what the probabilities.
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a degree
from University X.
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr.
from University X.
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr.
from University X.
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr.
from University X.
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr.
from University X.
F would receive a degree
F would receive a degree
F would receive a degree
F would receive a degree
6. Imagine that you are advising Mr. G. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that Mr. G's deceptive play would succeed.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable for the risky play in question to be attempted.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the play would succeed.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the play would succeed.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the play would succeed.
The chances are 7 in 10 that the play would succeed.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the play would succeed.
Place a check here if you think Mr. G should not attempt the
risky play, no matter what the probabilities.
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7. Imagine that you are advising Mr. H. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that Mr. H would succeed as a concert pianist.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable for Mr. H to continue with his musical training.
.
 place a check here if you think Mr. H should not pursue his
musical training, no matter what the probabilities.
T h e
 chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert
pianist.
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert
pianist.
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert
pianist.
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert
pianist.
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert
pianist.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. J. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds of a successful escape from the prisoner-of-
war camp.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable for an escape to be attempted.
The chances are 1 in 10 that the escape would succeed.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the escape would succeed.
~ The chances are 5 in 10 that the escape would succeed.
~~ The chances are 7 in 10 that the escape would succeed.
The chances are 9 in 10 that the escape would succeed.
Place a check here if you think Mr. J should not try to escape,
no matter what the probabilities.
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9. Imagine that you are advising Mr. K. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds of Mr. K's winning the election in his district.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. K to run for political office.
Place a check here if you think Mr. K should not run for
political office no matter what the probabilities.
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. K would win the
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr.
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr.
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr.
K would win the
K would win the
K would win the
election,
election,
election.
election.
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. K would win the election.
10. Imagine that you are advising Mr. L. Listed below are several
probabilities or odds that a solution would be found to the difficult,
long-term problem that Mr. L has in mind.
Please check the lowest probability that you would consider
acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. L to work on the more
difficult long-term problem.
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long-term
problem.
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long-term
problem.
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long-term
problem.
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long-term
problem.
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long-term
problem.
Place a check here if you think Mr. L should not choose the long-
term, difficult problem, no matter what the probabilities.
APPENDIX B
DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUCTIONS
The following instructions were read to the non-discussants:
We have seated you in groups, but before we do
anything else, we need to get some opinions from each
one of you as individuals. It's very important to do
this part on your own, so please don't talk to your
fellow group members or anyone else during this work
on the opinion questionnaire. While I'm telling you how
to do this work, though, feel free to ask me any ques-
tions you have about it.
The booklets we gave you describe several problem
situations people might run into in everyday life. In
each problem, the main person in the situation has to
make a decision. On the first two pages of your booklets
there are a couple of examples of the kind of problems
you'll be doing. In the first one, "Mr. M is contemplating
marriage to Miss T, a girl whom he has known for a
little more than a year. Recently, however, a number
of arguments have occurred between them suggesting
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some sharp differences of opinion in the way each
views certain matters. Indeed, they decide to seek
professional advice from a marriage counselor as to
whether it would be wise for them to marry. On the
basis of these meetings with a marriage counselor,
they realize that a happy marriage, while possible,
would not be assured. "
In each one of the situations you'll be reading about,
the main person--like Mr. M--has two choices. First
of all, in each case there's something he can do--like
getting married-- that could get him something he wants
that he doesn't have--like a happy marriage. That's
the risky choice, because if it doesn't work--if the
marriage fails, for example--he loses. Then, he also
has a safer choice--like staying single in our example.
It 's almost sure not to fail, but it leaves him just where
he was in the first place. He doesn't gain, but he
doesn't lose either. So should the person play it safe
and hang on to what he already has or take his chances
and try to gain something? There are four things to
think about: how things are now, what the person could
gain, what he could lose, and what his chances are.
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We don't want you to try to figure out how good
his chances really might be. What we want you to do
is decide how good his chances ought to be before he
should try the risky course of action--like getting
married. How sure would you have to be that things
would work out before you'd tell the person to take a
chance and shoot for the advantage? We want your
opinions about how big a risk the person in each
problem should take. In other words, choose the
lowest odds or probability of success you'd have to
have before you'd advise the main person in each situ-
ation to take the risk and try to improve his situation.
Now we want to get your opinions about what the main
person in each decision problem should do. We gave
you answer booklets for you to mark your opinions in.
If you'd be willing for him to try it even though
there's a strong chance the action he'd have to take--
getting married, for instance--would fail, then you'd
be willing to settle for low odds like one out of ten
of improving his situation. The bigger the chance you're
willing to take, the lower the odds or probability you'll
insist on. The surer you have to be, the higher the odds
you'll require. If one chance of succeeding out of ten
isn't safe enough for you, three in ten gives you better
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odds. If three in ten is the lowest you'll go--the
riskiest you'll be--you wouldn't take a chance if the
odds were just one in ten. If you want to gain something
you have to take a chance. If you want more guarantee
of succeeding before you'll take the chance, you'll have
to settle for just keeping what you've got.
If you need at least fifty-fifty odds, choose "five
in ten. " On some problems, you may feel the person
shouldn't risk doing anything unless he has a seven in
ten probability of success. Nine in ten is getting close
to asking for a guarantee that things will turn out to the
person's advantage. There may be situations you would
never take a chance on, no matter how good the odds are
that the person would gain by taking the risky action. So
besides odds of one, three, five, seven, and nine in
ten, you can also choose to refuse to take any chance at all.
Remember, choose the lowest odds you would take for
each decision problem and not the odds you think the
person actually has of succeeding. There aren't any
right answers and each decision is different. The odds
you choose--or your refusal to take a risk--are your own
opinions. Sometimes you'll think the person should take
more chances, sometimes less. If you accept low odds,
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e r
you're saying the person should take more risks. Highe
odds mean you're playing it safer and recommending
taking fewer chances.
Now let's try Example A--the one about marriage
that I read you. On the first page of your answer
booklet, you'll find places to mark your opinions about
the marriage decision. The instructions say, "imagine
that you are advising Mr. M and Miss T. Listed below
are several probabilities or odds that their marriage
would prove to be a happy and successful one. " Then
it says, "Please check the lowest probability that you
would consider acceptable for Mr. M and Miss T to
get married. "
There are six choices for each decision. You can
mark odds of one in ten, three in ten, five in ten, seven
in ten, nine in ten, or the choice that says, "Don't try
it no matter what the odds are. " That last choice means
you won't take any risk and "one in ten" means you'll
take a really big risk with the others in between. The
lower you mark, the bigger the risk. The higher you
mark, the more careful you want the person to be. The
choices in the answer booklet say, "Place a check here
if you think Mr. M and Miss T should not marry no matter
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what the probabilities. The chances are nine in ten that
the marriage would be happy and successful. The
chances are seven in ten that the marriage would be
happy and successful. " The chances are five in ten,
are three in ten, and the chances are one in ten that the
risky action--getting married--would get Mr. M and Miss
T what they want--a happy marriage which is an improve-
ment over things as they are. Now everybody--on your
own--check off your advice to the couple. If you don't
understand how to give your opinion or if you have trouble
as you work, raise your hand for help.
After the subjects practiced the first example, the experimenter asked
if there were any questions, then he read the following instructions:
Now read Example B on the next page and answer it.
Ask me if you want anything explained.
After questions had been answered about the procedure during the
second practice example, the experimenter read the following instructions:
O. K. Now we're ready to do the ten numbered problems
in the booklet. They're the same kind of problems you
just did, and you'll find places to check your opinions
about them after the examples in the answer booklet.
We want every one of you to put down your own opinion.
Don't talk to anybody until everybody's done. We
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don't want names on the booklets. We're just
interested in true individual opinions. There
aren't any right or wrong choices--just j^ our
own beliefs or feelings. Any questions? O.K.
Everybody on your own. No need to hurry.
Don't leave out any problems. When you
finish, stay in your seats and remain quiet
until we tell you what to do next.
The following instructions wore read to the discussants:
We have seated you in groups so you can
carry on discussions with the other two people
in your own group without hearing or disturbing
people in other groups. What we want you to
discuss are some situations or problems people
might run into in everyday life. On the first two
pages of the booklets we gave you there are two
examples of the kind of situations we want you to
discuss. In the first one, "Mr. M is contemplating
marriage to Miss T, a girl whom he has known
for a little more than a year. Recently, however,
a number of arguments have occurred between
them suggesting some sharp differences of
opinion in the way each views certain matters.
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Indeed, they decide to seek professional advice
from a marriage counselor as to whether it
would be wise for them to marry. On the
basis of these meetings with a marriage counselor,
they realize that a happy marriage, while
possible, would not be assured."
In each one of the situations inside the
booklets--the main person (like Mr. M) has
two choices. First of all, in each case there's
something he can do--like getting married--
that could get him something he wants that
he doesn't have--like a happy marriage. That's
the risky choice, because if it doesn't work—
if the marriage fails, for example--he loses.
Then, he also has a safer choice — like staying
single in our example. It's almost sure not
to fail, but it leaves him just where he was in
the first place. He doesn't gain, but he doesn't
lose, either. So should the person play it
safe and hang on to what he already has or
take his chances and try to gain something?
There are four things to think about: how
things are now, what the person could gain,
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what he could lose, and what his chances are.
That 's what we want each group to talk about.
Tell your fellow members what you think and
why you think it. Don't talk to anybody who
isn't in your group. It's up to you how you
handle the discussion and what you say about
the problems. It ' ll be easy to find things to
talk about in these problems, so stick to the
subject--the decision and what you'd advise the
main person to do and why. We want you to
read each problem and discuss it with the other
two members of your group--not anybody else--
for about five minutes. I'll tell you when to start
and when to go on to the next problem. Now
let ' s t ry the one about marriage, and on this
example you can ask me to explain anything you
need to know about what you're supposed to do.
Any questions before we start? O. K. Read the
example again and start discussing it.
After five minutes the following instructions were read:
O. K. Stop discussing the first example and
read Example B and discuss it. Again, call on
me for help, and I'll stop you in five minutes.
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Any questions? No talking between groups--just talk
to the people in your group. Ready? Read and
discuss the second example.
After five more minutes the following instructions were read:
I'm sure you have the idea now. From now on,
you won't, even talk to me. When I say start, dis-
cuss Number 1 inside the booklet until I stop you,
then I'll tell you to start Number 2, and so on.
Don't talk about anything but the problem you're
supposed to be discussing--not even other problems.
Don't skip any of them or go back to any of them.
And absolutely no talking outside your group. Any
questions? O.K. Ready for Number 1? Go ahead.
Begin.
After the subjects had discussed all ten items, the experimenter
handed out the answer booklets and read the following instructions:
Now each one of you has an answer booklet to give
us your individual opinions about the problem situations
you've been discussing. Remember, the main person
in each situation has to make a decision. He has two
choices--to do something (like getting married) or
leaving things alone (like staying single). One choice
is riskv but could gain the person something--like a
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happy marriage. The other choice is safer. It
doesn't improve his circumstances or make
them worse. Again the question is whether to
play it safe and hang on to what he already has
or take his chances and try to gain an advantage.
But in the answer booklet we want you to tell
us more than just whether to gamble or not.
What we want you to tell us in the answer book-
let is how good his chances ought to be before
he should try the risky course of action. Don't
try to figure out how good his chances really
might be. Tell us in your opinion how good
they should be. How sure would you have to be
that things would work out before you'd tell the
person to take a chance and shoot for the
advantage? We want your opinions about how
big a risk the person in each problem should
take. In other words, choose the lowest odds
or probability of success you'd have to have before
you'd advise the main person in each situation to
take the risk and try to improve his situation.
If you'd be willing for him to try it even though
there's a strong chance the action he d have to take--
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getting married, for instance--would fail, then
you'd be willing to settle for low odds like one
out of ten of improving his situation. The biggc
the chance you're willing to take, the lower the
odds or probability you'll insist on. The surer
you have to be, the higher the odds you'll require.
If one chance of succeeding out of ten isn't safe
enough for you, three in ten gives you better
odds. If the lowest you'll go--the riskiest you'll
be--is_ three in ten, you wouldn't take a chance
if the odds were just one in ten. If you want to
gain something you have to take a chance. If
you want more guarantee of succeeding before
you'll take the chance, you'll have to settle for
just keeping what you've got more of the time.
If you need at least fifty-fifty odds, choose
"five in ten. " On some problems, you may feel
the person shouldn't risk doing anything unless he
has a seven in ten probability of success. Nine
in ten is getting close to asking for a guarantee
that things will turn out to the person's advantage.
There may be situations you would never take a
chance on, no matter how good the odds are that
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the person would gain by taking the risky action.
So besides odds of one, three, five, seven, and
nine in ten, you can also choose to refuse to take
any chance at all. Remember, choose the lowest
odds you would take for each decision, not the odds
you think the person actually has of succeeding.
There aren't any right answers, and each decision
is different. The odds you choose--or your reft;sal
to take a risk--are your own opinions. Sometimes
you'll feel the person should take more risks.
Higher odds mean you're playing it safer and
recommending taking fewer chances.
Now let's try the marriage example. On the
first page of the answer booklets we gave you,
you'll find places to mark your opinions about the
marriage decision. The instructions say, "Imagine
that you are advising Mr. M and Miss T. Listed
below are several probabilities or odds that
their marriage would prove to be a happy and
successful one. " Then it says, "Please check the
lowest probability that you would consider acceptable
for Mr. M and Miss T to get married. "
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There are six choices for each decision. You
can mark odds of one in ten, three in ten, five in
ten, seven in ten, nine in ten, or the choice that says,
"Don't try it no matter what the odds are. " That
last choice means you won't take any risk and "one
in ten" means you'll take a really big risk with the
others in between. The lower you mark, the bigger
the risk. The higher you mark, the more careful you
want the person to be. The choices on the answer book-
let say, "Place a check here if you think Mr. M and
Miss T should not marry no matter what the probabi-
lities. The chances are nine in ten that the marriage
would be happy and successful. The chances are seven
in ten that the marriage would be happy and success-
ful. " The chances are five in ten, are three in ten,
and the chances are one in ten that the risky action--
getting married--would get Mr. M and Miss T what
they want--a happy marriage which is an improvement
over things as they are.
Before you start marking your opinions on the
marriage problem, let me remind you that now we're
interested in strictly private opinions. So--everybody
on your own- - check ymor individual advice to the couple.
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If you don't understand how to give your opinion
or if you have trouble as you work, raise your hand
for help.
After practice on the first example, the experimenter asked if there
were any questions, then he read the following instructions:
Now read Example B on the next page and
answer it. Ask me if you want anything explained.
After questions had been answered about the procedure during the
second practice example, the following instructions were read.
O. K. Now we're ready to do the ten numbered
problems inside the booklet. They're the same kind
of problems you just did, and you'll find places to
check your opinions about them after the examples
on the answer booklet. You've already discussed
these items in your groups, but don't forget that
now we want individual opinions. Don't talk to
anybody--including your fellow group members--
until everybody has finished all of the problems.
We don't want names on the booklets. We're
just interested in true individual opinions. There
aren't any right or wrong choices-just your own
beliefs or feelings. Any questions? O.K. Every-
body on your own. No need to hurry. Don't leave
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out any problems. When you finish, just wait
in your seats quietly until we tell you what to
do next.
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